# CIVILIAN SECRETARIAT FOR POLICE SERVICE

# GUIDELINES TO ENHANCE SAPS

# PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

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## ACRONYMS, FIGURES, TABLES AND BOXES

**APP**      Annual Performance Plan
**CCHI**     Cambridge Crime Harm Index
**CSC**      Community Score Card
**CSPS**     Civilian Secretariat for Police Service
**DPME**     Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
**EIS**      Efficiency Index System
**GBH**      Grievous Bodily Harm
**IPID**     Independent Police Investigative Directorate
**KIN**      Key Informant Model
**MTSF**     Medium-Term Strategic Framework
**NDP**      National Development Plan
**NHW**      Neighbourhood Watch
**PFMA**     Public Finance Management Act
**SAPS**     South African Police Service
**StatsSA**  Statistics South Africa
**THRR**     Theoretical Human Resource Requirement
**USAID**    United States Agency for International Development
**VOC**      Victims of Crime
**WPP**      2016 White Paper on Policing
**WPSS**     2016 White Paper on Safety and Security

## 1.    CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Policing is central to statehood. But what do police do and how does one measure it? What impact do police activities have on crime, order, safety or social cohesion? These are important questions which pose perennial challenges in policing the world over.

The post-apartheid policing project has striven to be equitable, accountable, efficient, lawful and ethical. While it has achieved numerous successes, it has also proven less successful in many ways, most notably in winning public trust. In 2018, just 54% of people were satisfied with the police in their area[1] and in 2016, 54% of people did not trust police.[2]

The South African Police Service (SAPS) currently consumes approximately 6.5% of the national budget. Its allocation has generally increased at levels above inflation and stands at R99,1 billion in 2018/19[3], a real value increase of 2.5, and a per capita expenditure almost twice what it was in 1995/96.[4]

Although increased spending correlated with reductions in murder, increased trust in police, and increased detection rates until 2011, this relationship no longer exists.[5] Convictions for serious crimes have also declined significantly since 2009/10.[6]

Increased spending has not improved police performance or outcomes in recent years.[7] In fact, for most of the sixteen years during which South Africa's murder rate plummeted (1994 to 2011), the SAPS had fewer staff and resources, and a smaller budget than it did in 2018. In contrast, the organisation has maintained a staff complement of roughly 195 000 since 2011, while murder has increased each year since.

[1] StatsSA (2018) *Victims of Crime*

[2] Afrobarometer (2016) *Summary of Results: Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey in South Africa, 2015*, Johannesburg, South Africa. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary of results/saf-r6-sor.pdf.

[3]   National   Treasury   of   South   Africa   (2018)   *Budget   Review   2018*.   Available   at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/review/FullBR.pdf (accessed 7 November 2018)

[4] Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (2017) *State of Democratic Policing Report*

[5] Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (2017) *State of Democratic Policing Report*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Treasury presentation at SAPS colloquium

This means that future improvements in police effectiveness will require changes in the way police work.

The largest portion of the SAPS budget (75%) is spent on personnel. However, because most police work takes place in public, it is hard for SAPS managers to know what police officials do once they leave a police station or office, or to measure the impact or cost efficiency of their time and activities.

Measuring what police do is expensive, complicated and time consuming. While most people want to feel safe and for police to assist them when called, police managers want to be able to draw on regular, simple metrics to guide daily and weekly operations, evaluate employee performance and ascertain their impact.[8] At the same time, government and civil society want to be able consult indicators to hold police accountable.[9]

The SAPS has an impressive and complex performance management architecture. However, the organisation continues to place too much emphasis on reported crime as a measure of police performance, with all manner of unintended and harmful consequences.[10]

This guideline document reviews the SAPS Efficiency Index System (EIS) – formerly known as the *Performance Chart* - and primary operational indicators and proposes a methodology for refining the way performance is measured. It suggests that while reported crime, detection and conviction rates are vital to performance management, they should be used as guides that inform multi-sectoral problem-oriented policing, rather than pure measures of failure or success, or as justifications for punishment or reward. To do this, it recommends that the SAPS embark on an ambitious study of performance at a select number of sample stations, using a range of tools to measures and assess police work, and to use the lessons learned to revise performance management systems across the organisation.

It proposes that this methodology be contextualised within a framework that recognises recommendations made in the State of Democratic Policing report, that measures of trust and murder should be the ultimate guides to effectiveness in the SAPS, and that, where possible, resource allocation and distribution should be incentivised and measured to ensure it is just and rational.

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[8] Klockers, C. (1999) 'Some really cheap ways of measuring what really matters' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C.

[9] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.476

[10] Faull, A. (2015) 'Measured governance?', *Public Administration and Development*

Although these points are touched on in this framework, readers and users should consult the State of Democratic Policing report for the detailed analysis informing these arguments.

## 2.    CURRENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS

The South African state takes an outcomes-based approach to governance. This aims to make clear what it expects to achieve, how it expects to achieve it, and how it will know whether it has been achieved.[11]

The Public Finance Management Act (PMFA) requires government departments to annually submit measurable objectives for each primary area of their budget vote.[12] The SAPS does this through its Annual Performance Plan (APP), which is developed in partnership with the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME).[13]

The SAPS' APP is predominantly based on the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), which lists the objectives required to bring about the vision of the National Development Plan (NDP). Outcome 3 of the MTSF informs the goal that "*all people in South Africa are and feel safe*".[14] It sets out the following objectives and indicators, and while these are generally excellent, they are, for the most part, not localised enough to positively shape police practice:[15]

**Box 1: MTSF Objectives and Indicators, 2014-2019**

| Objectives | Indicators |
|---|---|
| • Reduced levels of contact crime <br> • An efficient and effective Criminal Justice System <br> • South Africa's borders effectively defended, protected, secured and well- | • A reduction in the number of reported contact crimes <br> • An increase in the proportion of citizens feeling safe when walking alone during the day and night |

[11] Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (2010) *Guide to the outcomes approach*, p.9

[12] RSA Public Finance Management Act, Sec. 27(4)

[13] Timm, J (unpublished - 2017) *A description of the performance management system of the South African Police Service in the context of the National Development Plan*.

[14] Republic of South Africa (2014) *Medium Term Strategic Framework Appendix 3 Outcome 3: All people in South Africa are and feel safe*

[15] Republic of South Africa (2014) *Medium Term Strategic Framework*, p.4-5

| Objectives | Indicators |
|---|---|
| managed<br>• Secure cyber space<br>• Domestic stability ensured<br>• Secure identity of all persons in South Africa<br>• Corruption in the public and private sectors reduced | • An increase in the proportion of households that are satisfied with police services in their area<br>• Improvement in citizen perceptions of crime levels, and government efforts to reduce crime<br>• An improvement in South Africa's ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index |

It also outlines a set of sub-outcomes, indicators and targets aligned with these. Each year, the SAPS APP and Annual Report present the organisation's performance indicators and outputs in relation to these and expenditure. However, as noted by the DPME, 'a close examination of the MTSF...and the APP...reveals a results chain gone wrong', with MTSF impact indicators replicated as performance targets for visible policing.[16] As a result, the only MTSF objective that strongly features in the management and minds of station officials is the targeted reduction in crime.

It should be noted that the reported crime and detective-focused structure of the SAPS EIS was in place before the MTSF 2014-2019 targets were developed. This suggests that the MTSF targets were partially selected based on how the SAPS was already evaluating itself.

The information presented in the APP and Annual Report is sourced from the SAPS EIS. Although the EIS draws from and assess an impressive and relevant range of SAPS data, it most heavily weights reported crime, followed by a cluster of detective targets.

**The SAPS Efficiency Index System**
The SAPS EIS is a measurement system intended to promote the meeting of targets identified in the APP. Progress is measured in the areas of crime prevention, crime reaction, crime investigation, human resource management, vehicle management and data integrity. The EIS has always included an

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[16] Timm, (unpublished 2017) *A description of the performance management system of the South African Police Service in the context of the National Development Plan*

acknowledgement that community perceptions are important and should be measured, but this has never been achieved. Although the system appears well rounded, 45% of a station's assessment is based on levels of recorded crime (crime prevention) and 35% on detective service measures, many of which generate perverse incentives.

**Figure 1: Dimensions of the SAPS Efficiency Index System**



The EIS was developed in the late nineties and rolled out from 2004. It was intended to:[17]

- Identify areas of good / poor performance in terms of targeted results
- Initiate corrective action if required including assistance to poor performing entities
- Continuously monitor progress and the impact of corrective action

It measures activity based on input, output and outcomes, and defines an output as the result of the application of police resources. It aims to measure this by quantifying the amount of policing provided.[18]

The EIS defines an outcome as the impact of police actions. Although it acknowledges that an outcome is the result of the output – not the output itself, it measures outcomes using only a narrow range of quantifiable but arguably flawed data - primarily reported crime and investigation metrics.

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[17] SAPS (2012) *Performance Chart Briefing to Portfolio Committee on Police*, 6 March, p.3

[18] SAPS, *Performance Chart Learning Programme*, 2012/13, p. 3

The EIS frames effectiveness as the extent to which the SAPS achieves its targets, and by satisfying the needs and demands of its customers. However, its customers – the public, do not set EIS targets. Nor are their perceptions, experiences or judgements of police fed into the evaluation architecture. Rather, targets are determined for each police station based on its own prior performance, and in relation to national targets linked to the MTSF. This means that the expectation of a 2% reduction in priority crimes nationwide (10% over the five-year MTSF period), is cascaded down to station level.

*Outputs* are measures of police-initiated activities, such as vehicles or people searched, while *outcomes* are the impact of outputs on communities and society. However, despite their best intentions, police have limited control over the outcome of their outputs.[19] Herein lies the fundamental weakness of the EIS – its data is both too narrowly and over-interpreted.

The structure of the system shapes SAPS priorities. By emphasising reported crime, SAPS management implies that keeping reported crime down is what is expected of police. Similarly, by including withdrawn cases in the detection rate, detectives are incentivised to encourage withdrawals.

In this way, measurement is not neutral, but rather institutionalises judgments about what good policing looks like.[20] But the more controllable a performance measure, the more likely it is to become a perverse incentive for abuse. While police cannot prevent or investigate all crime, they can prevent victims from reporting crime, or persuade them to withdraw cases to improve detection rates.

*Outputs* are also susceptible to interpretative ambiguity. An increase in domestic violence or sexual assault reports could signal improved trust in police, rather than increased crime. This may be why so many more crimes were reported to police in the late nineties – a previously illegitimate police organisation and state were deemed legitimate and victims turned to them for help.[21] Ultimately, when reviewing fluctuations in reported crime, it is impossible to account for all confounding factors and very unhelpful to assume a clear link between police inputs, outputs and reported crime.

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[19] Davis, R.C. (2012) *Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement*, RAND Centre on Quality Policing

[20] Neyroud, P., Davis, E. & Boyd, E. (unpublished - 2014) *Do we know good policing when we see it? How should a Mayor or Police and Crime Commissioner assess the performance of their Police Chief?*

[21] Leggett, T. (220) 'Performance Measurement for the South African Police Service: Setting the Benchmarks' *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, 49, pp.55-85

## 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

As the recognised primary law enforcement agency responsible for crime prevention, police must work to reduce and prevent crime, but should – however - not be judged on fluctuations in crime reported to police. Police should be thought of as guardians or 'community well-being workers', rather than as 'crime fighters'. The former acknowledges the breadth of their work, while the latter reduces it to crime. This re-framing must take place within the organisation and society at large.

By framing police as narrowly focused on crime, they are set up to fail. As the SAPS acknowledges, the drivers of crime cannot be addressed by police alone. And yet political and organisational rhetoric routinely emphasise crime, the use of force and criminal law, which capture the organisational and public imagination.[22] SAPS officials are in turn primed for related activities – rapid response and public displays of force – and both public and police in turn judge police on these, despite their having limited impact on safety.[23] Such police actions can promote arbitrary arrest and misuse of force, which can undermine trust in police and waste precious police resources.[24]

Similarly, the annual release of crime statistics, the emphasis on recorded crime, arrests and seizures in shift and detective briefings, official statements and documents, signal to police and the public that crime and punishment are the defining features of the SAPS - their primary goal being to reduce reported crime.[25] The resultant pressure to meet reduction targets encourages manipulation of data, with false data reported up the hierarchy.[26]

While much is made of the SAPS annual release of crime statistics, it is unlikely that reported fluctuations significantly alter people's feelings of safety or their judgements of police effectiveness.

[22] D. Bayley, 1994 'What do the police do?' reprinted in in Newburn, T. (ed.) 2005 *Policing: Key Readings*, Cullompton: Willan Publishing

[23] R.V Ericson, 1982 'The police as reproducers of order' in 'Reproducing Order: a study of Police patrol work', Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982: 3-30) in Newburn, T. (ed) 2005, Policing: Key Readings, Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p.220; P.K Manning, 1978. 'The police: mandate, strategies and appearances' reprinted in Newburn, T. (ed.) 2005 *Policing: key readings*, Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p.196; D. Bayley, 1994 'What do the police do?' reprinted in in Newburn, T. (ed.) 2005 *Policing: Key Readings*, Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p.161; Frydl, K. & Skogan, W. (2004) *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*, Washington, DC: National Academies Press

[24] Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (2017) *State of Democratic Policing Report*

[25] Nigel Fielding & Martin Innes 2006 'Reassurance Policing, Community Policing and Measuring Police Performance', *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 16:02, p.127

[26] Faull, A. (2017) *Police Work and Identity*, Faull, A. (2016) *Measured Governance?*

Rather, these are informed by personal and peer / familial-group experiences, perceived levels of dis/order, and media.[27]

Reported crime provides only limited insight into the state of safety. Many crimes are never reported to police. This is as true of South Africa as elsewhere (see Figure 2).[28] Some crimes are more likely to be reported by some people and not others, even where crime levels are constant (e.g. insured victims reporting property crime). Furthermore, many crimes are difficult to detect, or involve no obvious victim (e.g. corruption, drug use). Reported crime alone is therefore a weak measure of performance and source of operational planning.

Crime control is also only one aspect of the police mandate. The SAPS also has a constitutional obligation to uphold the law, maintain public order, foster safety and protect people from threats.[29] Reported crime is a crude measure of these obligations. Although South Africans generally rank crime among their greatest concerns[30], focus on reported crime as a primary measure of policing risks ignoring the many other expectations communities have of police.[31] It also ignores emerging, broader interpretations of the police mandate that are not crime-focused, such as the priority to protect human rights[32] , or ensuring the overall health and wellbeing of communities[33] through integration in a web of safety and security providers.[34]

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[27] Stephens, D.W. (1999) 'Measuring what matters' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings*. US Department of Justice; Washington D.C.

[28] O'Regan, D. (2018) *Police-citizen interaction in Africa: An exploration of factors that influence victims' reporting of crimes*. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 180; Reiner, R. (2016) *Crime*; Stats SA (2018)

[29] Republic of South Africa (1996) *Constitution of South Africa*

[30] Afrobarometer (2016) *Round 6 Survey in South Africa, 2015*; Human Science Research Council (2016) *Service Delivery Challenges in South Africa South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) Compendium of Results*, HSRC: Pretoria; Gauteng City-Region Observatory (2018) *Media release: GCRO's 5th Quality of Life survey (2017/18)*. Available at: http://gcro.ac.za/media/redactor_files/GCRO%20QoL%20Survey%202018_Release%202.pdf (accessed 14 November 2018)

[31] Sparrow, M. (2015) *Measuring performance in a modern police organisation*. New Perspectives in Policing. Harvard Kennedy School & National Institute of Justice, p.4

[32] Statement made by Chief of the Bavarian Police (Germany), Wolfgang Sommer, at workshop with SAPS senior management at the CSIR, Pretoria, on 15 November 2018

[33] Statement made by Superintendent Stan Gilmour of the Thames Valley Police (UK), at the Safer Western Cape conference, River Club, Cape Town, on 12 November 2018

[34] The Expert Panel on the Future of Canadian Policing Models (2014) *Policing Canada in the 21st century: new Policing for new challenges*. Council of Canadian Academies. Available at: https://www.scienceadvice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/policing_fullreporten.pdf

**Figure 2: Victims who reported crime to police 2015/16 & 2017/18**



Performance measures should help organisations improve their performance based on their purpose and vision. Ideally, this means helping managers understand problems and how to address them, and maintaining high standards of conduct.[35] However, emphasising reported crime, over which police have limited control, can promote ill-considered reactions that compete with public needs and undermine more effective, problem-oriented policing. This is particularly the case in contexts of poor community-police trust, and the absence of systems to monitor the integrity and standardisation of reporting practices.

Some level of crime will always exist. Even where crime declines significantly, it must eventually plateau. Crime reduction-chasing metrics can fail to account for this, especially where a station is measured against itself (i.e. crime reported the previous week, month or year). While there is likely room for significant reductions in violent and property crime in most urban and many rural police precincts in South Africa, convincing patrol police – the public interface with the SAPS – that their primary objective is to prevent crime from being reported, incentivises bad police-public relations and discourages problem-oriented policing. As a result, police service and legitimacy can be eroded.

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[35] Curits, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing*, Home Office, UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-use-of-targets-in-policing (accessed 24 September 2018)

Research in fact indicates that countries with higher levels of public trust in the police have higher rates of reported crime (the more people trust the police, the more likely they are inclined to report crime).

Reported crime and the rate at which cases are detected / cleared are easily manipulated by police. [36] Similarly, crime dependent on police action for detection, such as drug possession and drunk driving, indicate police activity rather than criminality, and are thus easily increased or reduced. Furthermore, police can often meet the targets they set for themselves without it resulting in public acceptance of performance, or perceptions of effectiveness or legitimacy.[37] This is apparent when considering Table 1 (Select crimes reported to police), Figure 3 (17 community reported serious crimes) together with Figure 4 (Percentage of people satisfied with police) and Figure 5 (Feelings of safety). Together, they show that while the SAPS reported that general crime was declining, satisfaction with police and feelings of safety also declined – the opposite of one would expect. This suggests that SAPS inputs and outputs did not produce the intended outcomes (i.e. customer satisfaction and safety), showing that the logic underpinning the EIS, and the policing it incentivises, are flawed.

**Figure 3: 17 Community-reported serious crimes 2008-2018**



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
[36] Klockers, p. 204

[37] Saunders, J., Popper, S.W., Morral, A.R., Davis, R.C., Berrebi, C., Leuschner, K.J., Efron, S., Segalovitz, B., Riley, J.K. (2013) *Effective Policing for 21st-Century Israel*, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica

**Figure 4: Percentage of people satisfied with police in their area 2011-2018**



**Figure 5: Feelings of safety 2011-2018**



Table 1 presents the year-on-year and five-year changes in the most prominent crime categories in relation to the SAPS 2017/18 crime data. While at face value most crime declined, the fact that murder, bank robbery and cash in transit heists increased casts doubt on the other figures. Common assault, assault GBH, attempted murder and murder form a continuum of violence, with SAPS analysis suggesting that most murder occurs because of arguments.[38] If murder increases, one would expect that violent arguments (assaults) would increase too. The fact that reported assaults declined suggests

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[38] SAPS (2018) *Annual Crime Report*, p.16

that the reported decline may not reflect a real decline in assaults. This is supported by the fact that fewer assault victims are reporting crime to police according to the 2017/18 Victims of Crime (VOC) survey. The survey also found that assaults had increased year-on-year, rather than declined.[39] Both these data contradict the SAPS data.

Importantly, the SAPS is aware of the limits of reported crime data in performance management. In its 2017/18 APP, it notes of its contact-crime reduction targets that:[40]

> *The performance indicator on the reduction of crime should not be viewed as a sole police performance measurement, as this does not lie within the direct control of the SAPS. Contribution towards the reduction of crime ought to be noted as a transversal performance indicator across the different spheres of government, thereby striving towards the achievement of Outcome 3, to ensure all people in South Africa are and feel safe.*

As such, although reported crime is an important tool for police management, viewing it as a reductionist indicator is poor measure of police performance, despite its common-sense appeal.

**Table 1: Select Crimes Reported to police 2017/18; 1-year and 5-year changes**

| CRIME TYPE | 2017/18 Totals | 1-Year change | 5-year change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Murder | 20336 | +7% | +25% |
| Attempted murder | 18233 | 0% | +12% |
| Assault GBH | 167352 | -2% | -10% |
| Common Assault | 156243 | 0% | -9% |
| Total sexual offences | 50108 | +1% | -18% |
| Common robbery | 50730 | -5% | -5% |
| Residential robbery | 22261 | 0% | +24% |
| Non-residential robbery | 20047 | -3% | +23% |
| Street robbery | 78278 | -2% | +30% |
| Carjacking | 16325 | -2% | +64% |
| Bank robbery | 13 | +333% | +86% |
| Cash in Transit robbery | 238 | +57% | +64% |

[39] Stats SA (2018) *Victims of Crime Survey 2017/18*

[40] SAPS (2017) *Annual Performance Plan*, p.26, 96

| CRIME TYPE | 2017/18 Totals | 1-Year change | 5-year change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Residential burglary | 228094 | -8% | -13% |
| Theft of motor vehicle/cycle | 50663 | -5% | -13% |
| Theft out of or from motor vehicle | 129174 | -7% | -7% |
| All theft not mentioned elsewhere | 302656 | -8% | -15% |

**The problem with activity measures**

The traditional model of policing has been guided by the notions of random patrol, rapid response and follow up investigation. This, in turn, has informed public expectations of police and the metrics by which they have been – and often remain – evaluated: reported crime, response times, number of arrests and clearance / detection rates.[41] But this model is defunct and ineffective[42], while the data generated have the potential to show *if* police are working[43], but not *how* they are working.

A police official motivated to meet an activity target – such as number of people or vehicles stopped - can do so even when it is inappropriate, of poor quality, or goes against their own judgement. Furthermore, so much of what police do – perhaps most of what they do – goes unmeasured, despite it often contributing to improved quality of life. Recognising this, most police forces in the UK have abolished official targets. Since doing so, they have reported improved ethical crime recording, staff motivation, stable performance (fewer spikes), and more flexible and empowered officials.[44]

But if not through crime or activity indicators, how can performance be measured and evaluated? And, can or should a target-chasing culture such as that entrenched in the SAPS be unmade?

In an era of community and partnerships policing, it is not enough to simply fall back on reported crime and assume that fluctuations are adequate evaluations of police work. Crime is a complex social phenomenon, with a single crime able to shatter an individual or community's sense of safety.

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[41] Sparrow, M. (2015) *Measuring performance in a modern police organisation.* New Perspectives in Policing. Harvard Kennedy School & National Institute of Justice; Moore, M.H. & Poethig, M. (1999) 'The police as an agency of municipal government: implications for measuring police effectiveness' , in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C., p.151

[42] Frydl, K. & Skogan, W. (2004) *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence,* Washington, DC: National Academies Press

[43] Although activity indicators such as number of people or cars stopped, are easy to report in the absence of any actual activity, as documented in Chapter 4 of: Faull, A (2017) *Police Work and Identity: a South African ethnography.* Routledge: Abingdon

[44] Curtis, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing,* p.5, 14

Community expectations, experiences and perceptions must also be measured, as should official conduct, use of force and legitimacy.

To compliment these, the SAPS and government more broadly must present South Africans with richer stories than those simply implied through reported crime. These stories should reflect an understanding of crime as something in which all of government is invested, with the SAPS and its partners telling the country and communities how they play a particular role within broader efforts to generate safety and social order.[45]

## 4.    OBJECTIVE STATEMENT

The objective of this framework is to provide a set of comprehensive guidelines that will assist SAPS to develop strategic, outcome indicators that will; 1) serve as a more reliable measure of the impact of efforts to prevent and combat crime; and 2) serve as a barometer of the level of trust in the police by communities. These guidelines also form part of a broader framework to transform SAPS and professionalise the police service, in line with the policy intent of both the 2016 White Paper on Policing, and the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security.

Central to SAPS' revised performance metrics must be an approach to policing that aims to identify key local problems; develop a theory of change[46] to tackle them; identify related indicators to measure change; implement interventions; and monitor and measure their impact.

## 5.    CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### Policing and violence prevention: an integrated approach to practice and evaluation

Police are central to crime prevention and violence reduction. However, in democratic societies with high levels of crime and disorder like South Africa, police alone can do little to reduce general crime.

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[45] Sparrow, M. (2015) *Measuring performance in a modern police organisation*, p.31

[46] *"Theory of change* is a comprehensive description of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It is focused in particular on mapping out or "filling in" what has been described as the "missing middle" between what a programme or change initiative does (its activities or interventions) and how these lead to desired goals being achieved. It does this by first identifying the desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that must be in place (and how these related to one another causally) for the goals to occur". www.theroyofchange.org

As described by Kriegler and Shaw, the causes of South Africa's crime are easy to identify. For most people, relations with the state were historically characterised by humiliation, indignity and violence. In less than a century the country changed from one with a majority rural population to one predominantly based in cities. Millions of lives and hundreds of communities were eroded as people were forcibly moved to areas far from jobs with poor infrastructure, overcrowding, and insecure tenure. This destroyed established systems of community control and socialisation so that within new communities, novel forms of informal, often coercive control and governance emerged, often linked to violence.[47] They add that South Africa has followed 'the recipe' for a violent society 'to the letter' and added to it the availability of firearms, a culture of binge drinking, consumerist values, a home for organised crime and drugs.[48]

Knowing this, however, doesn't make reducing crime or violence simple. Should South Africa build the broadly inclusive society imagined in the NDP, it is very likely that general crime and violence will decline. To this end, the country is not short on evidence-informed vision or policy, but it has struggled with implementation.[49] It has been unable to mend a broken education system, stimulate and balance the economy, or end chronic unemployment. With these addressed, the SAPS' crime burden would almost certainly decline, while evidence-based interventions could be focused where they are most needed. These include:[50] a) cultivating safe, stable and nurturing relationships between children and parents; developing life skills in children and teenagers; c) reducing the availability and harmful use of alcohol; d) reducing access to dangerous weapons; e) promoting gender equality; f) changing cultural and social norms that support violence; g) supporting and caring for victims; h) promoting reason and rationality over intuition, 'culture' and superstition[51]; i) promoting good state governance and the rule of

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[47]Kriegler & Shaw (2015), *A Citizen's Guide to crime statistics in South Africa,* Jonathan Ball: Cape Town, *loc:*1552

[48] *Ibid.* loc:1566

[49] For insight into the policy framework see: Kruger, T., Lancaster, L., Landman, K., Liebermann, S., Louw, A., Robertshaw, R. (2016) *Making South Africa Safe: A Manual for Community-based Crime Prevention,* Pretoria: CSIR; Urban Safety Reference Group (2017) The State of Urban Safety in South Africa: Report. South African Cities Network: Johannesburg; Civilian Secretariat for Police (2016) *White Paper on Safety and Security*

[50] World Health Organisation (2010) *Violence Prevention: The Evidence.* Available at: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/4th_milestones_meeting/evidence_briefings_all.pdf (accessed 22 February 2018)

[51] Pinker, S. (2011) 'Decline of violence: taming the devil within us.' *Nature* 478(7369), pp. 309-311;

law, including by clamping down on corruption and organised crime, utilising order-promoting technologies and promoting police legitimacy.[52]

South Africa's 2016 White Paper(s) on Safety and Security (WPSS) and Policing (WPP) respectively, recommend just these kind of interventions, but how do they relate to policing?

## White Papers and Meta-Review

The 2016 WPP provides an overarching framework for a more democratic approach to policing that is aligned to the norms and values enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. If adequately implemented, the WPP will enhance organisational efficiency, as well as policing, in line with the NDP and constitutional imperatives. It will further strengthen the ability of SAPS to deliver on government's priority that all people of South Africa are and feel safe.

The 2016 WPSS in particular provides an opportunity for the development of a new, holistic performance management methodology for the SAPS. It envisages an intergovernmental approach to safety that includes health, education, social development, local government departments, and collaboration with communities and civil society organisations, which is evidence- and data-based.

The Civilian Secretariat for Police Service (CSPS) has proposed that the WPSS approach be piloted in several areas. In each area, data collection and analysis systems will be established to holistically assess local crime, violence, disorder, and community services and needs, in order to plan, guide and monitor appropriate interventions.

The philosophy behind this approach is partially supported by a prominent United States Agency for International Development (USAID) meta-review of what works to reduce community violence, including through policing, intended to guide violence prevention interventions in some of the world's most violent countries.[53] A central finding of that review is that effective violence prevention requires collaboration between police and other partners and the targeting of areas, people and behaviour most commonly associated with violence.

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[52] Eisner, M. (2015) *How to reduce homicide by 50% in the next 30 years*, Igarapé Institute. Available at: http://homicide.igarape.org.br/ (accessed 18 February 2018);

[53] Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016) *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the northern triangle*, USAID

In South Africa, as elsewhere, a large portion of crime and violence is clustered. In 2017/18, just 30 of the SAPS' 1144 police stations recorded 20% (4 124) of all murders countrywide, and accounted for 42% of the 1320 additional murders reported that year. In 2016/17, 148 stations (13%) recorded 50% of all murders. As indicated, for every murder reported it can be assumed that numerous other people fell victim to violence, whether reported to police or not.

Violence is also concentrated at particular times – usually over weekends - and is commonly associated with alcohol.[54]

To significantly reduce murder and violent crime, police resources should be focused where violence is most common and predictable. To do so, various metrics should be utilised, including reported crime, response times and detection rates. However, police deployment must be complimented by other measures that are harder to quantify.

The USAID review identified several elements common to effective violence prevention interventions. The first has been hinted at already - they should target areas where violence is greatest. Importantly, they should focus on specific problems, such as murder or gun violence in targeted areas, rather than attempting to reduce crime generally.

The second is that authorities must identify and reach out to high-risk individuals in targeted areas – those most likely to use violence (e.g. gang members, domestic abusers). They should offer them non-judgemental, compassionate support and opportunities to improve their lives while making it clear that violence will not be tolerated. Communication must be plain, recurrent, credible and backed by action. At the same time, sanctions for violence must be rapid, consistent and fair.

Thirdly, interventions must be well-coordinated between, for example, schools, social workers, prosecutors, community partners and police, flexible and responsive. Coordination should be guided by the fourth element - a *theory of change* that is understood by all involved. This is a clear story that links what is being done to the expected result. It does so by identifying long-term goals; determining the preconditions or requirements necessary to achieve those goals; and drawing basic assumptions about the context. Furthermore, it assists in identifying the interventions that are needed to create the desired change; developing indicators to measure outcomes to assess the performance of said interventions;

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[54] SAPS (2018) *Addendum to the Annual Report 2017/18*; Western Cape Government (2018) *Western Cape Injury Mortality Profile.*

and outlining a clear narrative to explain the logic of the intervention[55]. As such, the story must be logical, feasible, and acceptable to those involved. Police officials, social workers, teachers and others should understand the overall objective and how their respective roles inform it.

Theories of change integrate with a fifth element, the effective use of data to analyse problems, identify targets, guide interventions, drive implementation and evaluate effectiveness. This leads back to the start – the identification of the people, places and behaviour around which violence is most concentrated.

Based on this review, the following competences should be emphasised in the White Paper pilot sites:

- The ability to identify, track and plot harm in space and time (and people and behaviour)
- The ability to identify one or two key challenges based on this data (e.g. aggravated assault and robbery on weekend evenings)
- The ability to identify, communicate with and track likely offenders linked to that harm
- The ability to consult and collaborate with a range of stakeholders to develop a shared vision to address the harm
- The ability to implement the shared vision, monitor progress made towards it, adapt as necessary, and learn from the process

This approach aligns neatly with the SAPS sector policing strategy, which the organisation claims is at the heart of its work. However, the SAPS does not have an effective means to measure the extent to which sector policing is in place (the current system is a tick box exercise), and it is unlikely that sector policing is properly implemented in most areas. Readers and users can refer to **Annexure A** for further information on sector policing as a problem-oriented, community policing approach.

The next section considers the kinds of metrics which the SAPS could consider collecting and integrating into its evaluation systems at the WPSS and performance management pilot sights, which would better compliment the sector policing philosophy and policy. The idea would be to test a range of measures and identify those that are most effective and affordable. Lessons learned could inform adjustments to the EIS and organisational approach to performance management.

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[55] www.theoryofchange.org

## 6. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Measurement guides action. Where police officials are measured on arrests and response times, these will be prioritised. For police to be effective, the numbers that guide their work must be aligned with their mission and those skilled at meeting targets should be rewarded without removing them from tasks they are good at.

In that sector policing is the paradigm that guides the work of the SAPS, one of the most important positions is that of Sector Commander. These positions should be respected, sought after and esteemed, and successful sector commanders should feel appreciated and respected. To achieve this, the EIS should be expanded from its current narrow focus, to encompass something broader, as indicated in the MTSF and illustrated in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2: EIS Implementation Options[56]

|  | Narrow forms | Broader forms |
|---|---|---|
| Data sources | Reported crime | Multiple sources, including public health and victim surveys |
| Forms of analysis | Geographic (precinct) and temporal | Versatile, a full range of dimensions |
| Performance focus | Drive numbers down | Promote reporting to expose and address problems |
| Responsibility | Station commanders | Tailored to each problem |
| Managerial style | Adversarial | Cooperative / coaching |
| Preferred tactics | Directed patrol, street order maintenance | Full range of interventions |

Effective sector policing – indeed, community policing – is about problem solving in partnership with communities so that people feel safe and trust police. Problem solving should be emphasised through measurement (e.g. CCHI), as should feelings of safety, but this can be difficult to achieve in a way that guides police action.[57] Measuring crime, disorder and fear at the sector or hotspot level, for example, is

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[56] Sparrow (2015)

[57] Shilston, T. G. (2008) 'One, Two, Three, What Are We Still Counting for? Police Performance Regimes, Public Perceptions of Service Delivery and the Failure of Quantitative Measurement' *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 2, Issue 3, 1 January 2008, Pages 359–366, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pan043

possible, as are targeted interventions to address them and measure their impact.[58] Successful policing then becomes the ability to identify emerging risks and address them before they cause harm (i.e. before they result in numerous crime reports).[59] Outside of crime hotspots, such policing would not require frequent arrests or large-scale coercive interventions. Rather, responses would be restrained, skilful and strategic.

This approach should be aligned with the findings of the meta-review discussed in the previous section, as well as the broader evidence-based policing and violence prevention literature. In this regard, problem-oriented policing provides the framework and foundation for a policing approach that is: a) focused on specific places, problems and people, b) collaborative, c) data-based and d) based on a theory of change. These should be taken into account when evaluating police performance at the station level.

To evaluate democratic policing, efforts should be made to gauge whether police:[60]

1.    Are responsive to calls for service and the community, respect individual rights

2.    Work to promote feelings of safety, promote order and quality of life

3.    Adhere to high ethical standards, are respectful of citizens

4.    Interact with suspects, victims and the public in ways that promote satisfaction and confidence

5.    The organisation takes official morale, wellbeing and competencies seriously

6.    Work to reduce crime and victimisation

7.    Work economically in terms of resources

8.    Address problems, solve cases, promote order

9.    Use minimal force

This can be achieved using the type of indicators sketched in Table 3. Within this, focus should be on outcomes rather than inputs or outputs, the public should be allowed to judge efficacy (through surveys

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[58] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015) 'Revisiting 'Measuring what matters': Developing a suite of standardised performance measures for policing', Police Quarterly, Vol. 18(4), pp.469–495;

[59] Sparrow, M. (2015) Measuring performance in a modern police organisation, p.4; Moore, M.H. & Poethig, M. (1999) 'The police as an agency of municipal government: implications for measuring police effectiveness' , in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings. US Department of Justice: Washington D.C., p.152

[60] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.481

and transparent performance data), and policing should be evidence-based, with the EIS used to learn and hold managers accountable without being punitive.[61]

**Table 3: Examples of police performance categories, goals and indicators[62]**

| Category | Goal | Example Indicators |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Impact | Intended outcomes in communities and society at large: *to improve the safety and well-being of all people by promoting measures that prevent crime, harm and disorder.* | • Reported crime / Crime harm index<br>• Unreported crime (victim surveys)<br>• Violence-related injuries recorded at health facilities<br>• Feelings of safety<br>• Fear of crime<br>• Trust in police<br>• Measures of order / disorder<br>• Calls for service |
| Processes | Whether police are working as effectively, efficiently and legitimately as possible: *The police must undertake their basic mission with the approval of, and in collaboration with, the public and other agencies; All police work should be informed by the best available evidence.* | • Detection / clearance rates (for select crimes)<br>• Response times<br>• Compliance with National Instructions<br>• Operating costs per capita<br>• Use of force<br>• Evidence of partnerships and their impact (including diversion of youth; referrals)<br>• Quality and sharing of relevant data<br>• Evidence-based interventions and |

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[61] Peter Neyroud, Ed Davis & Ed Boyd (working draft 2014) *Do we know good policing when we see it? How should a Mayor or Police and Crime Commissioner assess the performance of their Police Chief?* p.3

[62] Compiled from: Independent Police Commission. (2013). *Policing for a better Britain*; Loader, I. (2016) "In Search of Civic Policing: Recasting the 'Peelian' Principles", *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 10:427–440; Kiedrowski, J., Petrunik, M, Macdonald, T., Melchers, R. (2013) *Canadian Police Board Views on the Use of Police Performance Metrics*, Compliance Strategy Group, p.13-14; Langworthy, R.H. 'Measuring What Matters: A Policing Research Institute'; Blumstein, A. 'Measuring what matters in policing'; Langworthy, R.H. (1999) 'What matters routinely?' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) (1999) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings*. US Department of Justice: Washington D.C

| Category | Goal | Example Indicators |
|---|---|---|
| | | problem solving practices<br>• Compliance with recommendations and reports of oversight bodies (such as the CSPS, Auditor-General, etc. including recommendations from internal structures such as the National Inspectorate) |
| Community | Perceptions and experiences of police work, integrity and legitimacy: *The police must seek to carry out their tasks in ways that contribute to social cohesion and solidarity; Must treat all those with whom they engage with fairness and respect. They should in their actions demonstrate respect for public space and the rule of law, even when not engaged in other tasks.* | • Increase in the proportion of households satisfied with police<br>• Trust in police<br>• Perceptions of legitimacy<br>• Perceptions of ethical service delivery<br>• Perceptions of equitable service delivery<br>• Measures of social cohesion<br>• Complaints against police |
| Organisational | Employee health, satisfaction and conduct; resource allocation; cost efficiency: *The organisation should treat all employees fairly; Police must be answerable to the law and democratically responsive to the people they serve; resources are allocated and used in service of all, but foremost for those most at risk of serious violent crime; Organised* | • Services requested and delivered to employees<br>• Officer audits (to determine whether officers are equipped with prescribed resources to undertake their job)<br>• Organisational climate surveys<br>• Absenteeism<br>• Resignations |

| Category | Goal | Example Indicators |
|----------|------|--------------------|
|  | *to achieve the optimal balance between effectiveness, cost-efficiency, accountability and responsiveness.* | • Complaints and disciplinary hearings<br>• Structural audits of resource levels, distribution and management (including location and use)[63]<br>• Just balance of resourcing and action across police precincts, divisions and units<br>• Functional and administrative audits (including an assessment of decisional bottlenecks)[64] |
| Environmental | Changes in the working environment that impact policing | • Political climate<br>• Demographic changes<br>• Critical events |

Data collected from these categories will support what Malcolm Sparrow suggests is the police's primary metric: *the ability to identify and address emerging crime, harm and safety threats*. Once a threat or problem is identified, it can be registered as a project and populated with data and a narrative to track progress. It should be noted, however, that measurement of the above metrics would not necessarily be the responsibility of the police alone. Some of the data could be collected as a collaborative effort with strategic partners (including other government departments, academia, civil society and business). Notably, specific metrics would be selected for specific problems:[65]

1. How was the problem identified?
2. How was the problem explored, analysed and diagnosed, and what project-specific metrics were identified to measure progress made?
3. What did police and partners do to address the problem? An action plan outlining plans, actions and adaptations as the project progresses.
4. What was the result? How did project metrics change over time and how was this explained?

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[63] Civilian Secretariat for Police Service. 2016 White Paper on Policing

[64] Civilian Secretariat for Police Service. 2016 White Paper on Policing

[65] Sparrow, M. (2016) *Handcuffed*; Sparrow, M. (2015) *Measuring performance in a modern police organisation*, p.15-17;

This model fits nicely with that proposed by Lawrence Sherman[66], as well as the framework recommended by the USAID meta review.[67]

Sherman believes that the best test of evidence-based policing is whether it has improved public safety and police legitimacy.[68] To answer this, one must measure public safety and perceptions of legitimacy. As such, Sherman recommends performance and policing systems based on *Targeting, Testing and Tracking*:[69]

1) *Targeting*: police should apply lessons from good practice and research to target scarce resources on predictable concentrations of harm.

2) *Testing*: Once police choose their priority targets they should select indictors to track review or conduct tests of police methods to ascertain what works best to reduce harm and what has limited or no impact.

3) *Tracking*: Once practices have been tested, police should generate and use internal evidence to track the daily delivery and effects of those practices, including public perceptions of police legitimacy.

Although Sparrow is more critical of evidence-based policing than Sherman, both agree that to test, track and learn from related interventions, police should identify indicators specific to each project, and use these to monitor their efficacy. This requires project-specific monitoring, rather than applying general indicators to general police work.

If the SAPS could implement Sparrow and Sherman's models it would generate a wealth of project accounts describing challenges and efforts to address them – a knowledge and evidence base upon which to improve policing, solve community problems, and assess police performance. This approach perfectly aligns with the problem-oriented policing paradigm. While it is not possible to uniformly implement such a system nationwide, it is possible to test one in select sites and to grow the methodology thereafter.

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[66] Sherman, L.W. (2013) 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking', *Crime and Justice*, 32(1), pp. 377–451.

[67] Abt, USAID

[68] *Lawrence W. Sherman 2013* The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, p.5

[69] *Ibid.*, p.6

**Box 2: Incentivising and measuring just, rational resource allocation**

The State of Democratic Policing report suggested that in some circumstances, increased police resources and spending can reduce murder and improve trust. It also found that police resources and budgets are irrationally allocated. This is partially because murders are weighted equally to other contact crimes in the SAPS THRR, and only 2.5 times the weight of less serious crimes. As a result, many areas with high murder rates have very few police officials in relation to the local population. What's more, it noted that only 60% of all SAPS staff are based at stations, not all of whom are operational officials. With a well-paid, top-heavy senior management at head office, only 58% of staff salaries are spent at station level.

As suggested under the discussion on the Crime Harm Index (CCHI) – see **Annexure B**, one way to address this would be to set performance targets for the organisation, provinces and clusters that incentivise managers to distribute finances and resources based on CCHI-like weights and to ensure a rational balance between the resourcing of stations/operational staff and senior-management. This measure would operate independently of the problem-oriented approach which is the focus of this report, but would be an important performance metric to build into the management of the SAPS.

**What to measure – a proposed methodology**

Within the problem-oriented policing paradigm, productivity targets such as arrests should be avoided, unless they are part of a well-considered, holistic strategy or theory of change. In these circumstances, managers must ensure that officials know how the enforcement activities fit the overall strategic objective, and that they are reasonable, legal, relevant and effective. They should also monitor them for negative consequences, and review / cease them when harms outweigh benefits, or once efficacy has been achieved.

This section offers additional insight into some of the proposed indicators outlined in Table 3.

*Measure: Problem Solving*

At the heart of sector / problem-oriented policing are partnerships. Working with, and for communities and other stakeholders to solve problems that cause disorder, anxiety and crime is central to this approach.

Evolving in parallel with community policing, albeit more slowly, has been the emergence of evidence-based policing and violence prevention.

In order to gauge efficacy in problem solving, it can be helpful to use a municipal problem-tracking mechanism.[70] This is particularly useful at the local government level, where various services can be coordinated by a municipality.[71] This may be harder for the SAPS, which falls under national government. Nevertheless, the SAPS could introduce or pilot a problem-tracking mechanism as part of its turn to research, evidence, and problem solving, with Provincial Commissioners leading this process within their respective jurisdictions. This would allow for the formal initiation of projects to address identified problems, to 'test' and 'track' the interventions, and to consolidate the records and findings of these interventions.

Whether it is through such a system or not, the first indicator of a serious effort at tackling a problem is to review the associated theory of change. SAPS stations should identify their major challenges, commit to addressing two or three of them, and establish related theories of change after consulting with partners about them. These should demonstrate:

- How the problem was identified and chosen;
- The data on which the problem and theory are based;
- The range of stakeholders involved and their respective roles / commitments; and
- The indicators by which it will be evaluated

In evaluating the theory of change and associated interventions, the following can be asked:[72]

- Is the collaboration targeted?
- How was the target identified?
- Who selected the problem?
- Who developed the intervention strategy?

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[70] Moore, M.H. & Poethig, M. (1999) 'The police as an agency of municipal government: implications for measuring police effectiveness', in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C., p.161

[71] See: https://eservices1.capetown.gov.za/coct/wapl/zsreq_app/index.html

[72] Friedman, W. & Clark, M. (1999) 'Community policing: What is the community and what can it do?' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) (1999) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C. p. 130

- How was labour divided between police, community and others?
- Were goals realistic?
- Were the desired outcomes realised (success)?
- Did participants understand the goal and process?
- Did the community know how to assess the police contribution?
- Did collaboration continue beyond the initial collaboration?

### Measure: (Dis)order

A relative measure of police effectiveness is the level of order or disorder in an area. As the most public interface with government, police officials are more likely than other government workers to become aware of erosions in the physical environment, such as illegal dumping or uncollected refuse. Problem-oriented policing puts an onus on police to alert relevant partners to such problems. Tracking disorder allows for these efforts, as well as the effectiveness of partnerships, to be gauged.

Measuring dis/order is also helpful to determine the relative police resource needs in an area, and for understanding environmental factors that may shape local problems. Measuring dis/order is therefore helpful to gauge police efficacy, identify the criteria by which to judge police, and guide police action.

Dis/order can be divided into two categories: social and physical.[73] Social disorder refers to behaviour – groups of truant youth, public drunks or suspect gang members occupying public space. Physical disorder is more constant and refers to the deterioration of structures and spaces – abandoned buildings, littered streets, and absent lighting. Both types of disorder signal a lack of local social order which can be associated with crime.[74] Measuring and tracking shifts in such disorder offer a means to gauge police impact and the police burden.

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[73] Skogan, W. 'Measuring what matters: crime, disorder, and fear' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) (1999) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C.

[74] For example, research by Jean Redpath in Galeshewe, Sol Plaatje Municipality, found that living in an area of poor refuse collection made residents more vulnerable to crim. See: Redpath, J. (unpublished) *The correlates of victimisation in Galeshewe and implications for local crime prevention.* Available at: https://www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/bundles/bundle-nine/category/243-5-research-documents.html?download=2354:55.%20Redpath%20on%20Galeshewe (accessed 21 November 2018) of being a victim of crime increase in risk).

Dis/order can be measured in several ways, including purposeful observation and surveys, both of which can be aided by smart technology.[75] Following agreed upon protocol or guided by a smartphone application, for instance, police or community observers can systematically document indicators of dis/order in particular areas (e.g. hotspots, sectors, precincts) and track them over time. This data can be used by a range of stakeholders and for a range of purposes. For example, the SAPS can use such records, together with evidence of communication with municipal officials, to hold other actors responsible for service delivery, or lack thereof, and its subsequent contribution to crime. This would also assist in easing the burden on policing by directing relevant issues to the relevant bodies / institutions.

In addition to the examples already mentioned, other indicators of disorder could include evidence of loitering, illegal dumping, lack of infrastructure or infrastructure in disrepair, use of parks and public spaces during the day and night, night time economy and property values. Alternately, community perceptions of disorder can be measured through standardised surveys.[76]

Systems of this sort have been and are being used in various contexts. Readers and users can refer to **Annexure C** for further examples.

These data can be combined with others gathered in an area to gauge the need for and impact of police, as well as the challenges they face. Complimentary data would include surveys of public safety, records of calls for police service, arrests made and crime reported.

### Measure: Calls for service

Calls for police service are particularly valuable, both as indicators of disorder and of public expectations and demands of police. A large portion, perhaps most calls for service, will not result in a formal report being filed, however the reason for the call remains immensely valuable in understanding where, when and why services are requested. Comparing calls for assistance to actual police activity allows a comparison of community demands / requests and police priorities.[77]

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[75] Stephens, D.W. 'Measuring what matters' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) (1999) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C., p.58

[76] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.483; Kiedrowski, J., Petrunik, M., Macdonald, T., Melchers, R. (2013) *Canadian Police Board Views on the Use of Police Performance Metrics,* Compliance Strategy Group

[77] Klockers, C. (1999) 'Some really cheap ways of measuring what really matters' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C, p.204

A general measure of dis/order and what ought not to be happening in a particular space, is an important set of data through which to understand the challenges of policing and to judge police activity.

**Box 3: Number of complaints attended, Cape Town Central, June 2011[78]**

| | |
|---|---|
| Burglar Alarm | 265 |
| Fighting | 202 |
| Car accident – serious injuries | 132 |
| Car accident – damage to vehicle | 127 |
| Rebellious person | 123 |
| Assault | 75 |
| Assault GBH | 68 |
| House breaking in progress | 64 |
| Emergency alarm/panic button | 61 |
| Theft in progress | 34 |
| Fire in progress | 28 |
| Malicious damage to property | 26 |
| Theft out of moto vehicle in progress | 15 |
| Driving under influence of alcohol | 14 |
| Murder in progress | 13 |
| Robbery in progress | 10 |
| Theft of vehicle in progress | 8 |
| Robbery from person in progress | 7 |
| Arson | 7 |
| Suicide in progress | 6 |
| Shooting incident in progress | 5 |
| Child abuse in progress | 5 |
| House robbery in progress | 5 |
| Armed robbery in progress | 4 |
| Car accident – fatal | 3 |
| Business robbery in progress | 3 |
| Gang fighting | 2 |
| **TOTAL** | **1312** |

One can estimate, based on the above data, that approximately 72% (946) of the calls to which police responded in June 2011 in that particular precinct did not result in a crime being formally recorded or a docket being opened. It is also possible that a large portion, perhaps a majority of the remaining 28% of calls did not result in a formal record. This is a good example of how emphasising reported crime as a measure of police activity and demand for service, misses the bulk of what police do. Additionally, operational planning based on the locations at which crime is recorded without factoring in the locations from which most calls for service originate, risks missing hotspots of disorder and violence.

The SAPS could benefit greatly from systematically collating, plotting and analysing calls for service and drawing on these to guide their problem solving and other planning activities.

### Box 4: Incentivising problem-oriented performance in individual officials

Performance management and monitoring is not helpful unless it changes the way officials do their work. Incentivising individual officials and measuring individual engagement in problem-oriented and community policing can be challenging. But aligning personnel performance appraisals with problem-oriented performance metrics can help the SAPS more effectively and efficiently realise its goals.

In the early nineties, the Houston Police Department embarked on an ambitious project to develop a new performance evaluation system for individual officers that could both motivate and assess them in relation to community policing.[79] More recently, policing in the UK has sought to align official performance targets with the specific neighbourhood policing priorities with which they work.[80]

The Houston project sought to improve official knowledge of community policing, clarify expectations of behaviour, productivity and responsibilities, and improve job satisfaction, among others. A range of measures were developed, which were customised to meet the role of each official. Evaluations involved assessing officials on their personal performance plans in relation to these broad themes

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[79] Oettmeier, T. & Wycoff, M.A. (1997) *Personnel Performance Evaluations in the Community Policing Context.* Police Executive Research Forum; Oettmeier, T. & Wycoff, M.A. (1993) *Evaluating patrol official performance under community policing: the Houston experience,* National Institute of Justice

[80] NPIA (2010) *Measuring Performance,* available at: https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/overview/Documents/localpolicingandconfidence[1].pdf (accessed 24 November 2018) *NPIA* (2012) Performance Development Review: National standards document. Available at: https://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Support/Reviewing-performance/Documents/PDRCircular-01-2012.pdf (accessed 24 November 2018)

and related sub-tasks. The broad themes were:

1. Learn characteristics of area, residents, businesses
2. Become acquainted with leaders in area
3. Make residents aware of who official is and what they are trying to accomplish
4. Identify area problems
5. Communicate with supervisors, other officials and citizens about the nature of the area and its problems
6. Investigate / do research to determine sources of problems
7. Plan ways of dealing with problem
8. Provide citizen information about ways they can handle
1. Help citizens develop appropriate expectations about what police can do and teach them how to interact effectively with police
2. Develop resources for responding to problem
3. Implement problem solution
4. Assess effectiveness of solution
5. Keep citizens informed

It is not difficult to see how such an appraisal system can be aligned with the theories of change at a particular station, and to the tasks assigned to different officials. The kinds of related questions that SAPS officials tasked with problem-oriented policing could be asked during evaluations include:

- What is your role in the theory of change at your station?
- What kind of results have you personally contributed towards while working in your sector?
- How is what you are doing impacting the sector?
- How are you collaborating with partners to address targeted problems?
- What do you hope to accomplish with your work in the next six months?
- How does what you have achieved and what you hope to achieve, align with the theory of change in which you currently operate?

### *Measure: Quality of Life*

Akin to measuring disorder is measuring quality of life across space. This can be ascertained by tracking problems identified by both government and members of the public, and metrics linked to local

health, school performance, existence and use of recreational and public facilities, infrastructure condition, parks, transportation and economy.[81] Here again, calls for service are an important indicator, as are faults or concerns registered through municipal or departmental websites and offices, on social and mainstream media.

Using quality of life indices as part of police performance metrics encourages police to recognise that they are central to overall community health and wellbeing, and so to involve themselves in problem solving and wellness initiatives beyond traditional enforcement activity.

### Measure: Community Perceptions

The SAPS describes its mission as being to ensure that people are and feel safe. However, it does not measure feelings of safety. Measuring such feelings should be a priority in pilot sites, together with trust in police.

There are various ways to measure perceptions in relation to safety and police performance. These include measures of:[82]

- Concern, the extent to which crime and disorder are considered serious challenges to a community (e.g. What are the biggest challenges facing your community?)
- Risk, the extent to which people fear falling victim to crime (e.g. How likely do you think it is that you will be burgled in the next year?)
- Safety, the extent to which people feel unsafe or fearful (e.g. Do you feel safe walking alone in your area of residence after dark?)
- Trust, the extent to which people trust police, trust their neighbours

Levels of fear can be gauged using a range of data. Calls for service, again, offer an indication of fear and distress in an area, particularly certain kinds of calls.[83] Similarly, the health of the night time

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[81] Moore, M.H. & Poethig, M. (1999) 'The police as an agency of municipal government: implications for measuring police effectiveness' , in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) *Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings.* US Department of Justice: Washington D.C., p.151

[82] Skogan, W. (1999) 'Measuring what matters: crime, disorder, and fear', p.45-48; Saunders *et al.* (2013) *Effective Policing for 21st-Century Israel*

[83] Stephens, D.W. (1999) 'Measuring what matters', p. 60

economy, after dark pedestrian life, target hardened private infrastructure, and community mobilisation (e.g. NHW patrols), are all indicators of fear.

Surveys of community perceptions need not be large or complex. They can involve small samples (e.g. 50-100) of people who have had contact with police in a given month, or an equivalent random sample of residents or businesses within a precinct. Surveys can be carried out telephonically and need not last more than a few minutes. Similar methods can be used to gauge community experiences of police and crime.

### *Measure: Community Experiences*

As important as measures of perceptions are measures of experience. These include:[84]

- Experiences of victimisation (victimisation rates)
- Experiences of police visibility (seeing police)
- Encountering police as a victim (by crime category)
- Encountering police as a suspect (by crime category)
- Experiences of police service (by category)
- Experiences of police corruption (by context)

Within these surveys, key elements to explore would include the following:[85]

- Satisfaction with treatment by police
- Satisfaction with how police handled the problem
- Whether police considered the citizen's views
- Whether police treated the citizen with dignity and respected their rights
- Whether police made their decisions and handled the situation based on facts

Some police forces are required to conduct victim satisfaction surveys with a sample of victims of particular crimes.[86] This can be achieved fairly simply through a system of random call backs using data captured by the SAPS.

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[84] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), pp.472-475;

[85] Worden, R.E. & McLean, S. (2017) *Mirage of police reform: procedural justice and police legitimacy*, University of California Press: Oakland, p. 150

Ideally, local victim surveys would be carried out in pilot areas with small, representative samples of precinct populations. This data would be invaluable in tracking real fluctuations in victimisation experiences, in addition to the other measures outlined above.

Another way to measure a large portion of encounters between police and the public is for police to issue receipts to those with whom they engage. These could contain a range of information, from the simple (name, date, time, reason for interaction, result of interaction, contact details for police and individual) to the detailed (short narrative explanation of encounter together with a tick-box summary). Receipts would generate good data on the kinds of interactions police have with the public, and give both the public and police a means through which to follow up with one another, should they need to. Ideally, receipts would be digital – completed on a smartphone or tablet and shared electronically. However, without this infrastructure in place, paper records which are captured / digitised at the station would suffice.

### *Measure: Procedural justice and police legitimacy*

A significant amount of research has explored procedural justice in policing. Pioneered by Tom Tyler, procedural justice theory posits that effective and efficient law enforcement requires that both police officials and the laws they enforce are broadly accepted as legitimate by those being policed. Various experimental and empirical data show that it is more important for public trust that police treat victims and offenders fairly and respectfully than that they arrest offenders. When police are perceived as being legitimate authorities, people are more likely to obey the law in the absence of police and to cooperate with them when required.[87] On the other hand, when they have negative experiences of police or other state authorities, they are may be more likely to disregard the law and offend.[88]

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[86] Curtis, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing*, p.23

[87] Donner, D., Maskaly, J., Fridell, L. & Jennings, W. (2015) "Policing and procedural justice: a state-of-the-art review", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 38 Issue: 1, pp.153-172; Murphy, K., and Mazerolle, L. (2016) Policing immigrants: Using a randomized control trial of procedural justice policing to promote trust and cooperation, *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 0(0) 1–20; Bradford, B. (2014) Policing and social identity: procedural justice, inclusion and cooperation between police and public, *Policing and Society*, 24:1, 22-43; Murphy, K., Mazerolle, L. & Bennett, S. (2014) Promoting trust in police: findings from a randomised experimental field trial of procedural justice policing, *Policing and Society*, 24:4, 405-424; Stanko B, Jackson J,Bradford B & Hohl K. (2012) A golden thread, a presence amongst uniforms, and a good deal of d ata: studying public confidence in the London Metropolitan Police. *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 22:3, 317-331; Sunshine J &Tyler T. 2003. The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. *Law & Society Review* 37(3), 513–548; Tyler TR. 2004. Enhancing police legitimacy. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (To better serve and protect: improving*

In the wake of this research, some police organisations have set themselves performance targets linked to public trust. Indeed, the MTSF includes a measure of satisfaction with police among its targets, but this has yet to be operationalised and, unless incentivised at station level, is unlikely to shape daily policing. While the importance of police legitimacy has been established, improving legitimacy by setting related targets has not, at least not where satisfaction with police is already high.[89] Nevertheless, considering the relatively low levels of public trust and satisfaction in the SAPS, it is worth the SAPS experimenting with station-based trust metrics in order to better incentivise fair, respectful, professional conduct from police, and to guide interventions where trust and satisfaction do not improve over time.

**Box 5: Performance measurement through integrity testing**

One way to incentivise professional conduct and to discourage and expose abuse of power, is to carry out integrity tests. These involve targeted and random interventions where undercover police stage interactions with on-duty police officials. Examples might include undercover police verbally abusing responding officials, offering them a bribe, or resisting arrest to ascertain how they respond.[90] The interactions are monitored and rated. Where police overstep their powers or break the law, disciplinary and/or legal action is taken against them. Where officials engage with the undercover unit in a professional manner, they are not told of the staged event and are left believing that the interaction was legitimate. The results of these tests are reported as a performance metric.

While targeted entrapment of this sort is at times used by the SAPS, it is not used randomly. In contrast, the New York Police Department carried out 8,167 'Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect' (CPR) tests in 2017 and reported the outcome of these under the performance goal 'Improve police/community relations'.[91] Importantly, the NYPD only employs 55,300 staff, meaning each employee had a one in seven chance of being subjected to a test that year. Such odds, coupled with

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police practice). 593: 84–99; Tyler, TR. 2006. Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation, *Annual Review of Psychology* 57: 375–400

[88] Gould, C. (2015) *Beaten Bad: the life histories of South Africa's repeat violent offenders.* ISS Monograph: Pretoria

[89] Worden, R.E. & McLean, S. (2017) *Mirage of police reform: procedural justice and police legitimacy*, p.165

[90] Faull, A (2009) 'Taking the test: Proactive policing of integrity and professionalism in the MPDs', *South African Crime Quarterly*, No. 27, pp.3-6

[91] New York City Police Department (2018) *What We Do.* Available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/pmmr2018/nypd.pdf (accessed 27 November 2018)

effective management, are certain to shape police behaviour.

For the SAPS to implement testing at this rate, it would need to carry out roughly 28 000 tests a year, or 76 a day. This type of testing would allow the SAPS to gauge a range of measures, including professional conduct, abuse of power, use of force, proper discretion, procedural justice and other measures. By carrying out thousands of tests each year and reporting their outcome, the SAPS will be able to discourage and act upon poor conduct and advertise and celebrate professional policing. Officials will be far less likely to abuse their power or act discourteously, should they believe they may be engaging with undercover members of an integrity unit. At the same time, they may be more likely to behave professionally if they believe they might be recognised for their professionalism.

### Box 6: Key Informants and Community Score Cards

With limitless resources, a plethora of survey and feedback instruments could be rolled out to measure the community perception and experience indicators outlined above. But resources are limited. One way around this, as mentioned, is to use a simple telephone survey approach. Another is to use what Martin Innes and Nigel Fielding call the Key Informant Model (KIN). Instead of formally surveying or consulting random, representative samples of populations, this approach seeks only the views of key community stakeholders.[92]

A similar approach known as the Community Score Card (CSC) was described by Andrew McLean at the Khayetlisha Commission of Inquiry.[93] The CSC involves two focus groups carried out in each sector at regular intervals, such as every month. One focus group is made up of community leaders and the other by young people in the sector. The focus groups are facilitated by a respected and neutral third party and the same people are involved each time. Discussions are documented and fed back to police in larger community meetings.

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[92] Fielding, N. & Innes, M. (2006) "Reassurance Policing, Community Policing and Measuring Police Performance", *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 16:02, 127-145

[93] McLean, A. (2014) *Submission to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry.* Available at: https://www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/bundles/bundle-twelve/category/266-1-expert-reports.html?download=2570:25.%20Andrew%20McLean%20-13%20May%202014&start=20 (accessed 30 November 2018)

*Measure: Discourtesy, abuse of power and civil claims*

To support procedural justice and professional conduct, police should measure complaints lodged against officials per 10,000 of each precinct population, disciplinary findings against officials, and civil claims paid out. This can only be achieved if complaints mechanisms are exceptionally easy for the public to access, and if they feel confident and safe using them. A review of SAPS disciplinary data suggests this may not be the case. Not only has there been a drastic decline in the number of hearings held (though this may be due to a recent change in Disciplinary Regulations), but most hearings are based on charges likely emanating from internal complaints rather than members of the public. In 2017/18 these included:

- 16.5% for failure to comply with or contravened an act, regulation or legal obligation;
- 13% for improper, disgraceful and unacceptable conduct;
- 7.6% for being absent from work without reason or permission;
- 4.6% for releasing a prisoner without proper authority;
- 4% for failure to carry out a lawful order or routine instruction; and
- 2.4% for assaulting or threatening to assault any other employee.

**Table 4: SAPS Disciplinary hearings 2011-2018**

|  | 2011/12 | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | 2016/16 | 2017/18 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Hearings** | 5540 | 5861 | 6053 | 4457 | 4431 | 4496 | 1960 |
| **No Sanction** | 2049 | 2148 | 2294 | 1763 | 2096 | 2279 | 887 |
| **Dismissal** | 532 | 496 | 537 | 378 | 361 | 323 | 220 |

The SAPS already measures its performance with regards to recommendations received from the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). In 2017/18 it received 3 985 recommendations and initiated 3 847 of these. The SAPS target is that 90% of disciplinary cases linked to alleged criminal offences by officials are finalised within 60 calendar days. In 2017/18, 85, just 38% (397) were finalised in this period.[94]

However, according to IPID, the SAPS continues to ignore many of its recommendations.[95] An additional indicator should therefore be the degree to which the SAPS is responsive to IPID, CSPS, and

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[94] SAPS (2018) *Annual Report 2017/18*, p. 46

[95] IPID (2018) *Annual Report 2017/18*, p. 11

other oversight structures; and complies with their recommendations. Reporting in this regard should ideally include the measures / steps taken to rectify adverse findings in this regard.

### Measure: Use of Force

One of the defining characteristics of policing is officials' capacity for force. Use of force allows police to do their work, but it also places them at risk of serious abuse, which in turn can render them illegitimate in the public eye. To mitigate this, and in support of the metrics of improved trust, satisfaction and legitimacy, the SAPS should introduce measures related to the use of force.[96] These would help the SAPS to ensure that officials know when to use force and how much force is appropriate and lawful in what circumstances. Measures would include:[97]

1.   The implementation of the use of force policy obliging officials to minimise the use of force
2.   A system to monitor the use of force (based on use of force reports)
3.   Evaluation of use of force incidents (by superiors, through evidence and interviews)
4.   Training to minimise use of force, based on evaluations of use of force incidents (feedback on reports)
5.   Taking corrective action where force has been misused or abused (feedback on reports)

All force, excluding verbal force and voluntary handcuffing, would be recorded, as would any use of force linked to a complaint, and the pointing of a firearm at a member of the public.

A simple indicator in this regard would be the number of use of force incidents per arrest, or as a proportion of all arrests.[98] Another indicator could be use of force incidents as a proportion of injuries suffered by police officials. The SAPS could annually summarise the findings of use of force data, identify lessons learned, and make these available to the public.[99] Monitoring and reporting on use of force could help win public trust and support. This proposal has been made in the past but has not been implemented.[100]

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[96] Bruce, D. (2011) 'Beyond Section 49: Control of the use of lethal

Force' SA Crime Quarterly, No.36, pp.3-12; Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.481

[97] Klockers, C. (1999) 'Some really cheap ways of measuring what really matters' in Langworthy, R.H. (ed.) Measuring what matters: Proceedings From the Policing Research Institute Meetings. US Department of Justice: Washington D.C, p.206

[98] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.483

[99] See for example the NYPD's Use of Force reports: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/use-of-force/use-of-force-2016.pdf

[100] CSVR (2011) A report on the workshop DEVELOPING A USE OF FORCE POLICY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE https://www.csvr.org.za/docs/UseOfForcePolicy_WorkshopReport_July2011.pdf

***Measure: Public health and EMS data***

Most crime, especially violent crime, is probably not reported to the SAPS. This is why murder is the best police-generated measure of violence, as it is highly detectable without victim reports.[101] However, other, more accurate indicators of violence are available within the public health system and can be used to gauge police efficacy.

Many victims of violence who do not report their experience to police will seek or require medical assistance. As such, emergency departments at health facilities and ambulance call out records can be exceptionally helpful to understand where violence occurs and what it entails. Although the collection of public health data falls outside the ambit of the police, when this data is combined with police recorded crime data, both are strengthened.

This is known as the Cardiff Model, and is used in cities across the developed world, primarily to guide police and public intervention in violence, but also to understand the causes and rates of violence. It has shown that the areas that generate most violence do not show up in police hotspot data, meaning that police planning is based on flawed information. By collecting data on violence-related injuries in health facilities and from ambulance call outs, police and other stakeholders are far better placed to address it,[102] ultimately leading to cost savings in healthcare and policing. Evaluations in areas where the model has been incorporated into policing and municipal governance suggest a 32% reduction in police-recorded injuries and a 42% reduction in violence-related injuries presenting at healthcare facilities. [103]

The Cardiff Model could fairly simply be implemented in facilities and EMS services serving WPSS target sites, before being expanded to those servicing the most violent 10% of police precincts in the country. Eventually, it could be rolled out across the country. All that would be required would be the collection of a few simple data points when processing injured patients, and sharing this information with police. The data would include:[104]

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[101] Civilian Secretariat for Police (2018) *State of Democratic Policing*

[102] Jonathan Shepherd, Vivienne Avery and Saifur Rahman (2016) 'Targeted Policing', 28 April, *www.policeprofessional.com*

[103] Florence C, Shepherd J, Brennan I, *et al.* (2014) 'An economic evaluation of anonymised information sharing in a partnership between health services, police and local government for preventing violence-related injury'
*Injury Prevention* ;20:108-114.

[104] Centre for Disease Control (2018) *Cardiff Model: community guidance for violence prevention*. CDC: Washington DC

- When the injury occurred (date and time)
- Where the injury took place (business name and/or street address or nearest intersection)
- How the injury happened and/or weapon used (e.g. hit, stabbed with a knife, shot)

Capturing this information would empower police to plan their deployment and problem-oriented activities using significantly more useful data than reported crime allows. Tracking fluctuations in violent injury would also be a better gauge of serious violence than reported violent crime, or even murder. While police should not be punished for fluctuations in violent injury reports, they can certainly be managed and incentivised in relation to them.

## Measure: Organisational Health and Ethics

A police organisation that expects officials to treat the public with courtesy and respect must treat its employees with the same. This, together with other employee values and perceptions, can be measured using climate surveys[105]; a) among a representative sample of the organisation, and b) at priority stations where police effectiveness and legitimacy are most important. Provincial Commissioners can take the lead in this regard. Surveys can explore a number of areas, but should include:

1) Job satisfaction and morale
2) Perceptions of leadership
3) Officer audits to determine how prepared officials feel the organisation has made them for their tasks (i.e. have they been provided the knowledge, skills and resources required)

Surveys that probe norms and values are also helpful, but may need to be administered by a partner agency. Absenteeism measures are also indicative of organisational and employee health, and should be taken into account.

Police organisations should strive to foster cultures and systems that recognise and reward professional conduct and non-quantifiable activities by police officials, such as good judgement. They

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[105] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.487

should also ensure clear communication and understanding of performance systems and how they help realise the police mandate.[106]

### Other Measures[107]

Ultimately, measures should encourage professional, democratic and evidence-based policing. As such, they should be considered in relation to the guidance outlined in Box 6. Other measures to consider experimenting with (in the target sites) include:

- Response times (from call received to police arrival – not just from dispatch to arrival)
- Reported crime per 10,000 residents (violent and property)
- Calls for service per official
- Number of police initiated actions per official
- Number of arrests per official
- Cost per arrest
- Cost per call for service answered
- Cost of police station / unit per resident
- Clearance / detection rates as percentage of reported crime
- Murder rates (e.g. number of murders where victims had protection orders against perpetrators)

A challenge with transitioning out of a target chasing performance environment is that the common-sense appeal of targets – especially reported crime and activity targets - may make target-chasing difficult to change at station level. It will also be important to ensure that officials remain motivated and active in the absence of specific targets.

Changing performance culture requires that managers communicate a clear vision linked to the problem solving and theory of change mandate, and support, recognise and reward good performance.[108] Managers will need to be guided out of a target-chasing mind-set. Removing / changing formal targets will not necessarily change the common-sense appeal of them.

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[106] Curtis, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing*, p.7

[107] Davis, R.C., Ortiz, C.W., Euler, S. & Kuykendall, L. (2015), p.483

[108] Curtis, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing*, p.6

The SAPS should seek to evaluate officials on their efforts to engage and problem solve together with the community. Managers should factor the potential for such engagements into operational planning.[109] Managers must also be equipped to interpret the range of new performance data collected and to use it to guide decisions.

The revised approach should not seek to punish but rather to mentor and uplift. It can retain the current system's number crunching and analysis of reported crime, response times, etc., but use it to solve problems and guide action, not punish officials.

Ideally, a performance system should not add unnecessary layers of reporting but rather generates the right kind of information at the right time, for the right people. [110] It will be important to bear this in mind as the proposed methodology is worked through and refined.

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[109] President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, p.44

[110] Curtis, I. (2015) *The use of targets in policing*, p.16

## 7. CRITERIA FOR A GOOD PERFORMANCE INDICATOR IN THE CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC POLICING

In addition to the policies and frameworks provided by DPME and National Treasury on performance information, it is also the intention of this guideline document to set out criteria for a good performance indicator in the context of democratic policing. These are outlined in Box 7 and Figure 6 respectively, for ease of reference.

**Box 7: Key elements of an effective performance management system[111]**

1. Everyone understands and acts upon the basic principles of performance management as relevant for their role
2. Active, visible leadership and ownership of performance management helps to foster a culture of continuous improvement
3. Officials and staff at all levels, and key partners understand their roles, responsibilities and relationships within the performance management framework
4. Priorities are clearly communicated, understood, and acted upon by all officials and staff
5. Learning and development equips officials and staff to improve performance
6. A clear, integrated planning framework links police, government and wider stakeholder priorities with traditional performance indicators, corporate planning, budgeting, risk and resource management
7. The force pursues improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of business processes that support delivery against priorities
8. Performance review structures serve all operational and support departments
9. Regular review of performance holds people to account against objectives, recognises good performance, and drives problem-solving and relentless follow-up
10. Good practice and lessons learned are quickly identified, shared and acted upon
11. Timely, accurate and relevant performance data is easily captured and shared
12. Insightful analysis, that is clearly communicated, supports intelligence led decision making that directs day-to-day activity

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[111] Home Office (2008) *Improving Performance: A Practical Guide to Police Performance Management*

**Figure 6: Basic outline of performance measurement system**

Key activates:
1. In partnership with stakeholders, identify priority problems
2. Develop theory of change to address problems
3. Identify indicators to measure progress against baseline measurements
4. Implement problem-solving activities, monitor and revise
5. Disseminate lessons learned

Demonstrate fair, just procedures
Ensure accountability

Ideally monitor:
1. Reported crime
2. Detection rate
3. Response time
4. Victim satisfaction (call back)
5. Contact satisfaction (call back)
6. Trust in police (telephonic survey)
7. Feelings of safety (telephonic survey)
8. Theory of change & related case studies

Effectiveness & Legitimacy

If possible, monitor:
1. Professionalism & integrity tests
2. Use of Force
3. Organisational Health
4. Public health-recorded violence data
5. Calls for service

## 8. PROPOSED MTSF OUTCOME 3 INDICATORS

In this section, those sub-outcomes, indicators and targets attributed to the police are presented and briefly commented on for ease of reference. The purpose of this section is also to propose a set of outcome indicators for the next MTSF period which are aligned to the methodology and approach outlined in this guideline document.

**Sub-Outcome 1: Reduced levels of contact crime:** Communities and all people feel unsafe due to unacceptably high levels of serious and violent crime such as murder, rape and aggravated robberies. To make certain that all people are and feel safe the following actions will be undertaken

| Action | Indicator | Baseline | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collect accurately assessed and timeously analysed information by conducting safety audits/assessments through research and Customer Satisfaction and Perception Surveys in order to have a meaningful impact on policing | Completed safety audits/assessments for policing areas (station, cluster, provincial, national) (one every five years) | N/A | First Safety Audit report 2014/2015 |
| | | | Three Safety Audit Reports by 2018/19 |
| | Customer satisfaction surveys for the SAPS (percentage improvement on customer satisfaction levels) | N/A | First Customer Satisfaction Survey report 2014/15 Comment: These surveys should be carried out in every high-crime police area and every area serving more than a certain number of people, each month |
| | | | Three Customer Satisfaction Surveys by 2018/19 |
| Implement an effective crime combating strategy and actions for contact crimes (includes murders, attempted murders, sexual offences, assault GBH, common assaults, robbery aggravating and robbery | Detection rate for contact crimes | 60 percent (426 171) | 62 percent (2014/15) Comment: These should be monitored and managed, but detectives should not in general be punished as a result of the outcome |

common). **Important**

| Indicator | Baseline | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Trial ready case dockets for contact crimes | 69 percent (144 501) | 66 percent (2018/19) |
| | | 71 percent (2014/15) **Comment: These should be monitored and managed, but detectives should not in general be punished as a result of the outcome** |
| | | 75 percent (2018/19) |
| **Promote community participation** | | |
| Percentage of operational community police forums implemented at police stations according to set guidelines (including: Community-Based Organizations, Faith-Based Organizations, Non-Government Organizations, Civil Society, Business, Organs of State) | 98% (1123 out of 1137) | 100 percent (all police stations)1 by 2015/16 and thereafter **Comment: All measures of community participation should be re-visited to discourage a tick-box approach to compliance. Rather, evidence should be generated through problem-solving case studies and theories of change** |
| Percentage of schools implementing | N/A | 100 percent (2018/19) |
| | | 100 percent in all schools by 2018/19 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| school safety programmes | | |
| Sustained community outreach programmes at all levels | N/A | A minimum of 2 per annum per level by 2018/19 |
| Number of operational community safety forums (CSFs) | 125 CSFs (2012/13) | 145 CSFs 2014/15<br><br>278 CSFs by 2018/19 |
| Provide training in areas of forensics, crime investigations, crimes against women and children, and in public order policing<br><br>Percentage of trainees declared competent in the following policing areas: forensic sciences, crime investigations, aspects relating to crimes against women and children and public order policing capability | 98 percent | 98 percent every year<br><br>Comment: This may incentivise manipulation of pass-rates by examiners and trainers |

**Sub-Outcome 2: An Efficient and Effective Criminal Justice system:** The CJS must deliver quality and professional services in an integrated, coordinated, effective and efficient manner. It must also provide swift, equitable and fair justice in criminal matters and effectively deter crime on a sustainable basis.

| Action | Indicator | Baseline | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Improve SAPS investigations | Interviews conducted with complainants by the investigating official | New Indicator | Within 24 hours after a case docket is registered (2014/15)[112]<br><br>Within 24 hours after a case docket is registered (2018/19) |
| | Computer-generated investigation progress report to complainants and victims of crime established | New Indicator | Developed by 2015/6 |
| | Detection rate for serious crimes (contact crime, contact related crime, property related crime, other serious crime) | 53.35 percent | Increase to 56 percent by 2014/15 and maintain it at that level thereafter<br><br>Comment: These should be monitored and managed, but detectives should not in general be punished as a result of the outcome |

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[112] The SAPS explain that the aim is to maintain the target of conducting interviews with complainants within 24 hours after a case has been registered throughout the MTSF period.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Improve pre-trial processes | Percentage of trial-ready case docket for serious crimes (contact crime, contact related crime, property related crime, other serious crime and crime detected as a result of police action) | 68.61 percent | Increase to 73.6 percent (2014/15) **Comment: These should be monitored and managed, but detectives should not in general be punished as a result of the outcome** |
| | | | Increase by 5 percent per annum by 2018/19 |
| Improve independent and impartial investigations of crimes allegedly committed by South African Police Services (SAPS) and Municipal Police Service (MPS) members. | Percentage of investigations completed | 50 percent completed cases | 55 percent completed cases by 2014/15 |
| | | | 60 percent 2018/19 |
| Institute disciplinary proceedings based on IPID recommendations | Percentage of IPID recommendations implemented | 84.4 percent (645 out of 764 cases) | 90 percent (2014/15) |
| | | | 100 percent (2018/19) |

**Sub-outcome 5: Ensure Domestic Stability:** To examine violent service delivery protests and violent industrial action so as to understand its root causes, manifestations and design measures to address them. In particular, the aim should be to ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights to protest action relating to service delivery and industrial action are exercised in a peaceful and non-violent manner.

| Action | Indicator | Baseline | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stabilise public protests | Percentage of medium to high-risk incidents stabilized in relation to requests received | 100% | 100 percent stabilised per annum |
| Capacitation of the Public Order Policing environment | Number of personnel recruited for public order policing additional to the current | 4 721 | 5 720 (4721+999) 2014/15 Increased to 9 500 by 2018/19 |
| Improve investigation and prosecution of criminal and violent conduct in public protests (with NPA and DCS) | Detection rate Trial ready rate Conviction rate | New indicators None None | New Indicator Baseline for all three indicators to be determined by March 2014/15 |

**Sub-outcome 7: Corruption in the public and private sectors reduced:** We will build a resilient anti-corruption system to successfully detect and investigate cases of alleged corruption with a view to prosecution, conviction and incarceration of perpetrators. This will hopefully serve as deterrence and contribute to ensuring a corruption-free society.

| Impact Indicator | Minister responsible for reporting on the indicator | Baseline | 2019 Target | Year 1 Targets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crime<br><br>Number of contact crimes reported (7 crimes) | Police | 617 239 | Reduced by 2 percent per financial year | Reduced by 2 percent<br><br>Comment: These targets should reviewed / dropped (an increase in reporting should be considered as an improvement in levels of trust in the police and their capabilities) |
| Number of crimes against women, children and other vulnerable groups reported | Police | 225 430 | Reduced by 2 percent per financial year | Reduce by 2 percent<br><br>Comment: These targets should reviewed / dropped (an increase in reporting should be considered as an improvement in levels of trust in the police and their capabilities) |
| Number of cases reported for unlawful possession of and | Police | 206 825 | Increase by 13 percent per financial year | Increase by 13 percent<br><br>Comment: These targets should |

| dealing in drugs | | | reviewed / dropped |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of people feeling safe walking alone in their area during the day | Presidency, (Supported by StatsSA) | 86 percent (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012 | 89 percent | **Comment: Some survey / qualitative indicators should be applied at most stations; major surveys should be carried out at White Paper target / pilot sites** |
| Percentage of people feeling safe walking alone in their area at night | Presidency, (Supported by StatsSA) | 37 percent (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012) | 39 percent | n/a |
| Percentage of households believing that the level of violent crime has gone down | Presidency, (Supported by StatsSA) | 38 percent (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012) | 55 percent | n/a |

Also targets to develop and implement various strategies, including Cybercrime, and to establish a National Cybercrime Centre, to train cybercrime experts and detect and convict cybercrime.

## 9.    RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic mission of the SAPS is to improve safety and well-being by promoting measures to prevent crime, harm and disorder. To achieve this, it is recommended that focus be placed on problem solving in partnership with communities, and on improving trust and legitimacy through fair, respectful treatment of all[113].

This guideline document sets out to propose a methodology for the development of new performance indicators that align with this vision, as well as that of the 2016 WPSS and WPP respectively. The proposed methodology is summarised under the section 'what to measure'. It is not a prescriptive methodology, but rather an exploratory one. It suggests that successful policing involves partnering with others to tackle crime and harm where they are most pronounced, while identify emerging risks elsewhere and addressing them before they cause significant harm. Interventions and tracked, revised and learned from.

It recommends that the SAPS seek to incentivise sector / problem-oriented policing by selecting several pilot sites and investing significant resources in tracking a range of indicators over a number of years. Out of this process, it should seek to gauge which indicators are most helpful in measuring police effectiveness and managing police practice.

At the same time, it should introduce simple measures of trust, legitimacy, satisfaction and safety at most police stations, and consider a measure of problem-oriented policing based on problem-specific theories of change and associated case reports.

Although this approach may appear expensive, it need not be. Call backs to a small sample of victims (victim satisfaction), people who have had contact with police (suspects), and community members (trust, feelings of safety) could be achieved relatively simply on a monthly basis, with significant benefit to SAPS managers. This would mean that the SAPS EIS finally attempts to measure the satisfaction of SAPS customers, as it has always intended doing. Generating, documenting and tracking a theory of change and related reports would be more time intensive, but streamlined systems could be developed to minimise unnecessary bureaucracy.

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[113] Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (2017) *State of Democratic Policing Report*

The SAPS should also introduce a measure to ensure the rational and just distribution of resources in service of those most vulnerable to violent crime. This can in part be achieved by using a tool such as the Cambridge Crime Harm Index to refine the weighting given to different crimes in the SAPS EIS. However, considering that so much crime remains unreported, murder should be given the most heavily weighted and used a proxy indicator of where policing and under state intervention is most needed.

Traditional performance measures have focused on targets (e.g. crime declines), short time frames (e.g. weeks, months) and have been driven from the top down.[114] In recent years, a more reflective approach to performance management has emerged, one which uses traditional performance data (e.g. reported crime, response times, clearance rates) as a guide and indicator rather than a target. These indicators are combined with qualitative measures and managers are given flexibility and discretion in planning and working around them to solve problems. The emphasis is on long term impact and organisational efficiency.

Other measures that should be prioritised for testing including:

1.    Professionalism and integrity tests (entrapment)
2.    Use of force
3.    Organisational health
4.    Public health-captured violence data

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[114] Savage, P. (2018)

## 10. ANNEXURES

### Annexure A: Sector Policing

Sector policing requires that all police precincts be divided into two or more units (sectors), which are intensively and repeatedly studied and managed by dedicated 'sector commanders', in partnership with the sector community (business, residents, schools, churches, etc.) to share information, address the underlying causes of crime and disorder, and to deploy resources and mobilise communities accordingly. Put another way, it is problem-oriented community policing.

SAPS National Instruction 3 of 2013 requires that Cluster Commanders ensure that all stations implement sector policing. They are expected to accomplish this by holding station-based '*visible policing*' and '*operational support*' commanders to account, who in turn must ensure that station-based sector commanders carry out the following:

- Deploy operational (visible) members and resources in accordance with the crime pattern and threat analysis
- Interact with and develop partnerships and programmes with sector communities to address crime;
- Hold regular sector forum meetings with the sector community, in which crime prevention and social issues affecting the community are discussed, and community needs identified; and
- Establish and quarterly review sector profiles, highlighting the causes of crime in the sector.

There are two key aspects of accountability built into the sector policing framework; i.e. internal and external. *Internal accountability* sees sector and other station managers accountable to those above them in the SAPS, while *external accountability* requires that station-based officials engage with and respond to sector communities. On paper, this is excellent but in practice it does not always work.

The SAPS' *Sector Policing Guide* is an excellent document that provides significantly more detail on sector policing than the National Instruction. It outlines what - in many ways - appears to be an ideal model of democratic policing. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that (m)any sector managers or other station-based officials have read it. As illustrated in the Khayelitsha Commission's report, the SAPS in many instances falls short of its own ideals.[115]

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[115] O'Regan (2014) *Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry*

The handbook states that:

1.    Commanders must identify hotspots and vulnerable communities; address community needs and make the most effective use of all available resources at a police station and in the community to address crime;

2.    Operational members and resources must be deployed in accordance with crime pattern and threat analysis[116], intelligence reports, Sector Crime Combatting Forum taskings[117], and community needs[118] including providing targeted visible patrols and attending to community complaints;[119]

3.    Station commanders must adapt sector policing to meet the needs of community[120] and initiate crime prevention programmes and projects based on community needs;[121]

4.    Where resources are not available for personnel deployment in each sector, 'members may be deployed according to the crime pattern and threats';[122] and

5.    Crime should be prioritised. Crime-prevention officials must choose which problems must be focused on. With limited resources at the crime-prevention official's disposal, it is impossible to focus on all the problems at the same time.[123]

This guidance allows Station and Sector Commanders to withdraw or withhold resources from one sector, problem, day or time and deploy them to another, in order to address the most serious crime and disorder challenges in their policing area. This vision aligns very well with the USAID guidance on effective violence prevention, as well as with other best practices in evidence-based policing. However, performance management in the SAPS is not structured to incentivise this model of policing, and so it is often not implemented.

The SAPS 2018/19 target for Sector Policing is that it is implemented at 95% of stations. But this is relatively easy to do on paper. The set criteria for the implementation of sector policing are as follows:[124]

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[116] P.17
[117] P.18
[118] P.39
[119] P.37
[120] P.20
[121] P.22
[122] P.38
[123] P.87

1. The police station area must be demarcated into at least two sectors; a permanent member must be appointed as a sector commander(s) to manage and coordinate all crime-related activities in the demarcated sector(s);

2. A sector profile must be compiled for each demarcated sector by the appointed sector commander;

3. Operational members and physical resources must be deployed, in accordance with the crime pattern and crime threat analysis to perform policing duties in the demarcated sectors to enhance service delivery based on the available resources and a sector forum(s) must be established or existing community structures may be utilised, as long as it facilitates community interaction and participation.

In 2016/17 the SAPS reported that 99% of stations had implemented sector policing. However, one of the few in-depth examinations of its implementation, carried out during the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, found that Khayelitsha's stations were not implementing Sector Policing as intended:

> *"We also note that the Task Team report reached a similar conclusion to the Schooling and Leamy report that often there were not sufficient resources to ensure that sector policing is properly implemented. They concluded that there was not compliance with the Western Cape Guideline 3/1/5/1/342." (p.356)*

> *"[T]he Commission finds on the record before it that none of the three Khayelitsha police stations produce regular or comprehensive crime pattern analyses or crime threat analyses, and accordingly such analyses are not discussed in SCCF meetings, and therefore the deployment of personnel cannot be taking place in terms of National Instruction 3/2013. In view of the Commission, this constitutes not only a major failure of compliance with a crucial National Instruction, but it also constitutes a major operational inefficiency at the three police stations for it means that the deployment of uniformed members on operational duties appears not to be done according to any strategic planning but on an unexplained and random basis." (p.356)*

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[124] SAPS (2018) *Annual Performance Plan 2018/19*, p. 30

*"The Commission, having perused the sector profiles provided, agrees that they were of a poor quality, containing inaccurate demographic information, and incomplete information of the businesses, churches and schools in each sector, nor did they contain adequate information about street committees or other key organisations in each sector. Importantly they did not appear to have been compiled with any reference to the station profile. Moreover, given the outdated nature of the contents of the sector plans, the Commission further concludes that they have not been updated quarterly as required by the National Instruction." (p. 357)*

While these findings are specific and relatively dated, it remains true that sector policing is probably inadequately supported, incentivised or monitored in the SAPS, despite its great potential. The challenge the SAPS faces is to adapt its performance measurement system to incentivise the implementation of its sector policing vision.

### Annexure B: Distinguishing Degrees of Harm: The Crime Harm Index

Evaluating stations against their own prior performance, as is done by the SAPS, is not unusual in CompStat systems.[125] However, it allows very unsafe and violent stations to 'perform' well while their precincts remain insecure. For example, a station where murder declines from 100 to 75, significantly improves its performance (by 25%) while remaining very violent. In contrast, a station where murder increases from 10 murders to 12 (20%), is ranked by the Chart as failing. One way to adjust the Chart to mitigate against this is to introduce something like the Cambridge Crime Harm Index (CCHI).[126]

First, it should be noted that the SAPS does not treat all crime equally. Reported contact crime and the investigation of contact crime account for 80% of the operational assessment of station performance.[127] Similarly, although the APP sets property-crime reduction targets of 2%, the MTSF only targets contact crime. Nevertheless, weighting all categories of contact crime uniformly does not appreciate the difference in severity of, for example, murder, assault GBH, street robbery and rape.

The CCHI may compliment the SAPS' system. While police know that some crimes are more important than others, they lack a standardised way to account for these differences across all crime categories.

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[125] However, using national targets does not seem normal. Indeed, it is counterintuitive.

[126] Sherman, L., Neyroud, P.W. & Neyroud, E. (2016) 'The Cambridge Crime Harm Index: Measuring Total Harm from Crime Based on Sentencing Guidelines' *Policing*, pp. 1–13 doi:10.1093/police/paw003

[127] Page 171-174 of Col Vermeulen's affidavit

The CCHI assigns a weight to each crime category that represents how harmful it is to society. It suggests the simplest way to assign values to crime types, is to consider the sentencing guidelines related to each offence. The number of recommended days in prison for a first-time offender would provide an indication of how severe the crime is. It then suggests taking the total weight for each indicator (crime type), and adding the subtotal of the weights together, providing an index of multiple indicators, and a bottom line for the harm caused by crime at a station or other accounting unit. The same system could be used to aggregate relative harm in windows of time, for example at night or over weekends, in order to guide deployment and problem-solving activities.

Box 9 present's the CCHI methodology. To illustrate it in practice, imagine a police station that records 100 crimes a month. Assume that the recommended sentence for a first shoplifting offence is 1 day in prison and the recommended sentence for a first culpable homicide is 10 years in prison (3650 days). If all 100 crimes at the station are shoplifting cases, the CCHI value will be 100. If all the crimes are culpable homicide, the CCHI value would be 10 X 3650 = 36,500. In both instances, the crime count is 100 but the gap between the relative harm is immense.

Currently, murder is generally used as a proxy for relative harm in South African police precincts. Considering the scale of murder in the country, the relative reliability of reported murder as an indication of all murder and of violence in general, and the likely underreporting of many other violent crimes, this makes sense. However, using a CCHI adds nuance to this relatively crude scale, especially where a CCHI can be adapted to take account of victimisation rates estimated based on the results of localised victim surveys, in addition to crime reported to police. This could be explored in high-murder areas where levels of violence may be high but trust in and reporting to police may be low.

**Box 9: Creating and calculating a crime harm index[128]**

| |
|---|
| 1. Count the number of crimes of each type in a police cluster, station or sector |
| 2. Multiply the count for each type by the median number of prison days recommended for crimes of that type by first offenders |
| 3. Name the product of that multiplication (crime count for a crime type X median days in prison) the Harm Subtotal (HST) for the crime type (for harm subtotal of days of prison for that offense type) |
| 4. Repeat steps 1, 2, and 3 for every type of crime recorded for the area |
| 5. Sum up all HSTs to yield the Total Crime Harm (TCH) |

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[128] Sherman (2014)

6. Create a standardised Crime Harm Index (CHI) for any area or population by dividing the estimated population size into the TCH to yield the CHI in that time period for that area (where population size estimates should ideally include the average daily transient counts, such as arrivals minus departures by public transport).

The CCHI can be used to gauge the relative challenges and risk dynamics at each police station. Where this reveals comparable risk profiles between stations, it can be considered with other indicators (e.g. calls for service, socio-economic factors) to develop indicators associated with optimal functioning in each risk environment.[129]

A CCHI could also be used by the SAPS to inform the allocation of resources to stations. A related performance measure for provincial, cluster and station managers could be based on a station's CHI and resource allocation in relation to those at other stations, and in relation to the spatio-temporal distribution of harm. In other words, provincial and cluster managers would be reviewed and measured on their ability to match resource allocation and deployment with relative risk based on the CHI.

Furthermore, if the public knows that resource allocation is based on reported crime, people may be more likely to report incidents to police, which would help police to better understand local crime dynamics and challenges, and provide new opportunities for trust building.[130] As pointed out in the State of Democratic Policing report, distributing finances and resources based on such weighted factors would be more rational than using the SAPS THRR formula.[131] Similarly, ensuring a rational ratio between the resourcing of stations/operational staff and head office/senior-management staff is key.

### Annexure C: Examples of Measuring Dis/order

The City of Cape Town's Programme EPIC allows emergency personnel to use smartphones and tablets to document disorder in the City. Similarly, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) has used smartphone community surveys to document the absence and rollout of tap and toilet

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[129] *Sherman, (2013),* p.59

[130] However, this may require an expansion of the methods through which crime can be reported in order to make reporting for efficient. This could be achieved, for example, using online or social-media based portals.

[131] Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (2017) *State of Democratic Policing Report*

infrastructure in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.[132] Less uniformly, smartphone applications such as the Johannesburg Road Agency (JRA)'s *Find and Fix* for pothole identification, the City of Johannesburg's *MyCityPower* app and the City of Cape Town's *C3* online fault logging system, allow for public reports of disorder.

**Annexure D: Police Performance Measurement in England and Wales**

In 2014 performance targets for police in the England and Wales were abandoned. In their place, a set of questions have come to guide evaluations. The focus is on three pillars: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, with each pillar evaluated according to a set of key questions and related diagnostics. Evaluations result in one of four grades: Outstanding, good, requires improvement, inadequate. Comparable evaluations are applied to fire and ambulance response services. This is part of a recognition of links between health, social inequality, crime and safety, and efforts to make police part of multi-agency neighbourhood projects.[133]

**Effectiveness: How effective are police at keeping people safe and reducing crime?[134]**

| Question | Diagnostic |
|---|---|
| How effective are police at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe? | 1. How effectively do police understand the communities they serve?<br>2. How effectively do police actions and activities help to prevent crime and tackle anti-social behaviour? |
| How effective are police at investigating crime and reducing re-offending? | 1. How effective is the initial investigative response?<br>2. How effectively do police investigate crime?<br>3. How effectively do police catch criminals? |
| How effective are police at protecting those who | 1. How effectively does the force identify |

[132] VPUU, 'TAPS & TOILETS: LOCAL SERVICE LEVELS'. Available at: http://vpuu.org.za/success-story/om-informal-settlements/ (accessed 16 October 2017)

[133] Public Health England (2018) *Policing and Health Collaboration in England and Wales: Landscape review*

[134] HMICFRS, *Promoting improvements in policing and fire & rescue services to make everyone safer.*

| are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims? | those who are vulnerable and assess their level of risk and need? |
|---|---|
| | 2. How effectively does the force initially respond to vulnerable victims? |
| | 3. How effectively does the force investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and work with external partners to keep victims safe? |
| How effective are police at tackling serious and organised crime? | 1. How effectively do police understand the threat and risk posed by serious and organised crime? |
| | 2. How effectively do police respond to serious and organised crime? |
| | 3. How effectively do police prevent serious and organised crime? |
| How effective are the police's specialised capabilities? | How effective are police arrangements for ensuring that they can respond to national threats? |

| Efficiency: How efficient are police at keeping people safe and reducing crime? | |
|---|---|
| **Question** | **Diagnostic** |
| How well do police understand demand? | 1. How well do police understand current demand? |
| | 2. How well do police understand things that affect demand? |
| How well do police use resources? | 1. How well do police understand the capability of their workforce? |
| | 2. How well do police understand the capability of their leaders? |
| | 3. Howe well do police allocate resources? |
| | 4. How well do police work with others? |
| How well do police plan for the future? | 1. Howe well do police predict future demand? |
| | 2. How well do police plan for the future in |

| | terms of its workforce? |
|---|---|
| | 3. How well do police plan for likely future demand? |

| Legitimacy: How legitimate is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime? (Does it have the consent and trust of the public, do employees consistently behave fairly and lawfully?) ||
|---|---|
| **Question** | **Diagnostic** |
| To what extend do police treat all people fairly and with respect? | 1. To what extend do police understand the importance of treating people with fairness and respect? <br> 2. How well do police understand the extent to which its employees treat the public fairly and with respect? <br> 3. How fairly do police use stop and search? |
| How well do police ensure their workforce behaves ethically and lawfully? | 1. How well do police develop and maintain an ethical culture? <br> 2. How accessible is the complaints system to all members of the public? <br> 3. How well do police identify and investigate potential discrimination by employees? |
| To what extend do police treat its workforce with fairness and respect? | 1. How well do police identify and act to improve fairness at work? <br> 2. How well do police support the wellbeing of employees? <br> 3. How fairly and effectively do police manage and develop individual performance and selection processes? |